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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to examine the issue of ‘lobbying’ in the EU legislative 
process, using an interdisciplinary analysis of the development of copyright laws as a way of 
explaining why some lobbyists are more successful than others in having their preferences taken into 
account in legislation, and how this success is achieved. As this article will demonstrate, the keys to 
successful lobbying in this field are information exchange, the ability to frame issues at an early stage 
in the legislative process (agenda setting), and the political salience of an issue. By assessing not only 
where legislative initiatives in copyright reform have been successful, such as the passing of the 
Information Society, Enforcement and Term Extension Directives, but also where legislative 
initiatives fail, as in the case of ACTA, it will be demonstrated that legislative success is not a simple 
case of ‘big business getting what it wants’, but of varying levels of political salience. Where the 
salience of an issue is low and voters consider that issue comparatively unimportant to other issues, 
industry representatives are able to effectively frame legislative outcomes. Where salience is high, 
and an issue important to voters, this ability is substantially reduced. By approaching copyright law 
development in this way, it is possible to reconceptualise the role of lobbying in the EU legislative 
process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On 4 July 2012, the European Parliament rejected the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), a plurilateral agreement concerning intellectual property rights and enforcement negotiated 
between the European Union and ten other nation states party to the World Trade Organization. 
Defeated by a resounding 478 votes to 39, the defeat of ACTA was seen as a success by Internet 
activist organizations that perceived ACTA to be anti-democratic and potentially hindering to 
freedom of expression. Some optimism seemed warranted, given the criticisms of European Union 
copyright policy tending towards upward harmonization of scope and duration, and increasingly 
restrictive limitations and exceptions to copyright. Nevertheless, it is important to contextualise the 
rejection of ACTA. Copyright, at least academically, is a fiercely contested subject. Lobbyists, it has 
been suggested, dominate copyright policy, and ‘lobbynomics’ carries more weight than ‘objective 
evidence’. This view, however, does not take into account that there are also industries, organizations 
and individuals that lobby against increases in copyright protection, and considers that lobbying can 
be perceived as interference in the legislative process. The purpose of this article is to examine the 
issue of lobbying in the EU more closely, using an interdisciplinary perspective to assess lobbying in 
the field of copyright law and determine why some lobbyists are more successful than others in 
having their preferences taken into account in legislation. As this article will demonstrate, the keys to 
successful lobbying in this field are the importance of information exchange, the ability to frame 
issues at an early stage in the legislative process (agenda setting), and the political salience of an 
issue. The article will begin by discussing the concept of lobbying in more detail, demonstrating that 
the key element of lobbying is the ability to provide policy makers with sector-specific information 
required for developing a legislative agenda, highlighting the information requirements of the 
European Commission and Parliament. The third section of the article will discuss what makes 
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lobbying successful, and why some lobbyists may be more successful than others, by focusing on the 
comparative ability to set agendas in legislative policy, and the impact that the political salience of an 
issue on the ability of lobbyists to influence legislation. Where salience is high, and voters aware of 
an issue, this ability to influence the process is reduced. Where salience is low, and voters unaware or 
comparatively uninterested in an issue, then the ability to influence the process is increased. In the 
fourth section, this framework will be applied to three case studies of contentious legislation passed 
by the European institutions in the field of copyright law, before demonstrating why a change in 
political salience and active citizen participation in the legislative process resulted in the European 
Parliament voting to reject an international agreement that two years earlier it had fully supported. 
 
2. Lobbying in the European Union: A Framework for Analysis 
 
The most important prerequisite in assessing the comparative success of certain lobbying groups in 
impacting the framing and direction of copyright policy in the EU is to determine what the term 
‘lobbying’ means, and who is to be considered a ‘lobbyist’. The term ‘lobbying’ may conjure up 
images of clandestine meetings between politicians and suited men exchanging envelopes in a car 
park, or briefcases full of money being slid across a desk in an dimly lit office in Washington DC. 
Indeed, as Lessig indicates, during the 19th Century practices such as open bribery were common, and 
not criminalised in the US until 1853.1 Nevertheless, the practice continued throughout the 19th 
Century and into the 20th, although in a somewhat more discreet fashion – ‘Lobbyists and members 
[of Congress] had to be discreet. There may have been duplicity but there were limits…in the main 
the practices were hidden, and therefore limited’.2 Contemporary lobbying, however, bears little 
resemblance to the largesse of the 1800s, either in the US or in Europe. Today, lobbying by 
                                                 
1 Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress - And A Plan To Stop It (Twelve 2012) 102 
2 ibid 
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professional lobbying organizations is considered a professional activity, subject to significant 
regulation and oversight.3 So, it is something of an oversimplification to say that lobbying is about 
the use of money to attain influence. Instead, at a general level, lobbying can be defined as any 
attempt to influence public policy.4 More precisely, ‘wherever government makes decisions that 
affect the interests of different groups – industry, consumers, labour unions, non-governmental 
organizations and others – those groups will seek to influence the decisions in their favour’.5 As will 
be demonstrated later in this article, this means that any actor has the potential to act in a lobbying 
capacity. In this respect, it is not only the representatives of large multinational corporations that are 
engaged in lobbying practices; academics seeking to influence the direction of lawmaking based on 
their research, trade unions on the basis of the interests of their members, and even individuals 
petitioning governments and parliaments all are engaged in ‘lobbying’. It must be stated here that this 
is not a normative statement, but an explanatory one.  The purpose of this paper is not to assess or 
argue the legitimacy of different forms of stakeholder participation, but to assess why some forms of 
engagement with the legislative process may be more effective than others.6 This again helps to 
reinforce why the question we should ask is not ‘why do European institutions listen to lobbyists 
when developing copyright laws?’ but ‘why are some lobbyists more successful than others in having 
their policies taken into account?’ 
Coen states that while not always seen as a welcome aspect of Western politics, most political 
scientists recognize that private interests have a legitimate and important role to play in the public 
                                                 
3 See, for example, the Lobbying and Disclosure Act 1995 (2 USC §1602) in the US. While the EU does not have a 
formal legislative regulatory system that covers lobbying, it nevertheless discloses the accounts of lobbyists’ activities 
through its ‘Transparency Register’, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/info/homePage.do> accessed 7 April 2014  
4 Christine Mahoney, ‘Lobbying Success In The United States And The European Union’ (2007) 27(1) Journal of Public 
Policy 33, 35. See also Robert Mack, ‘Lobbying Effectively In Brussels And Washington - Getting The Right Result’ 
(2005) 9(4) Journal of Communication Management 339, 340 
5 Mack (n 4) 339 
6 For a detailed analysis and consideration of the role that different lobbying groups may have on the political process, 
including whether different types of participation could be considered to promote or impinge democratic functions, see 
Grant Jordan and William A Maloney, Democracy And Interest Groups: Enhancing Participation? (Palgrave Macmillan 
2007) 
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policy process.7 One of the most important roles played by these lobbying organizations is the 
provision of information8 - Klüver argues that lobbying can be conceptualized as an exchange 
relationship between interdependent actors in which the European institutions trade influence for 
information.9  To put it another way, the reason why lobbyists have the ability to influence the 
legislative process is because they are in a position to provide information believed to be required by 
policy-makers. ‘In this context, information is valuable because of the uncertainty that pervades the 
political and policy processes’.10 In this respect, there is information asymmetry between political 
institutions and lobbying organizations. Policymakers cannot, and should not, be expected to be 
experts in every particular field of policy development, meaning that they are in a position where 
they have incomplete information regarding the repercussions of policy decisions and the possible 
repercussions of those decisions.11 Interest groups, and in particular, business and industry 
representatives are perfectly placed to take advantage of this information asymmetry – this is ‘due to 
[policy-makers’] capacity constraints, and because of interest groups’ own strong incentives to pool 
resources and conduct research on issues of concern to their members’.12 As one executive 
interviewed by Bernhagen and Braüninger commented, ‘I am actually surprised how often 
[ministerial civil servants] ring me up looking for information I would have assumed they would 
have at their fingertips…’13 This reinforces the interdependent relationship between lobbyists and 
policy-makers – lobbyists want their preferences taken into account, and in turn, policy-makers rely 
upon the information provided by these lobbyists in order to assess and choose between different 
                                                 
7 David Coen, ‘Empirical And Theoretical Studies In EU Lobbying’ (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 333, 
334. See also Jeremy Richardson, ‘Government, Interest Groups And Policy Change’ (2000) 48 Political Studies 1006 
8 Richardson (n 7) 1009; David Austen-Smith and John R Wright, ‘Competitive Lobbying For A Legislator’s Vote’ 
(1992) 9 Soc Choice Welfare 229, 231 
9 Heike Klüver, Lobbying In The European Union: Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions, And Policy Change (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 15 
10 Frank R Baumgartner, Lobbying And Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, And Why (University of Chicago Press 
2009) 123 
11 See, for example David Austen-Smith, ‘Information And Influence: Lobbying For Agendas And Votes’ (1993) 37 
American Journal of Political Science 799, 799–800; Klüver (n 9) 58; Baumgartner (n 10) 122–25; Richardson (n 7) 1009 
12 Patrick Bernhagen and Thomas Bräuninger, ‘Structural Power And Public Policy: A Signaling Model Of Business 
Lobbying In Democratic Capitalism’ (2005) 53 Political Studies 43, 47 
13 ibid 
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policy approaches. As Culpepper puts it, ‘company managers know more about the effect of legal 
changes on their companies than do politicians, and politicians know this’.14 
The European institutions are also reliant upon the information provided by interest groups in 
the same way as a national government or parliament. The European Commission has the sole right 
of legislative initiative in the EU,15 and as such is able to exert considerable influence over agenda 
setting.16 The Commission therefore plays a central role in the legislative process, acting as the motor 
of policy-making, albeit one limited by its relatively small budget.17 Schendelen states that ‘due to its 
scarce resources of budget and manpower the Commission has a strong appetite for information and 
support from outside’.18 So great is the need for information that not only is the Commission willing 
to receive information from lobbying organizations, but it actively seeks that information out. In fact, 
the information provided is indispensable to the Commission’s legislative efforts.19 Without it, the 
Commission is not in a position to determine the outcome of a particular legislative endeavour in a 
complex sector, such as economic development or copyright policy, and therefore the Commission 
consults widely on proposed regulation, demanding information in the form of evidence from 
interested parties (or stakeholders, as they are referred to by the Commission). It is through this 
supply of information that lobbyists are able to influence the legislative process20. Due to its position 
as legislative engine and its role in drafting policies, the Commission is regarded as being the main 
focal point of lobbying activity21, and businesses will therefore seek to influence the Commission 
                                                 
14 Pepper D Culpepper, Quiet Politics And Business Power: Corporate Control In Europe And Japan (Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 9 
15 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C 326/13 Article 17(2) 
16 Joseph Gardner, ‘Agenda-Setting Through The Backdoor? The Commission’s Use Of Its Power To Withdraw’ (2013) 
9 Journal of Politics & International Studies 562, 569; Neill Nugent, The European Commission (Palgrave 2001) 
17 Pieter Bouwen, ‘The European Commission’ in David Coen and Jeremy Richardson (eds), Lobbying the European 
Union institutions, actors, and issues (Oxford University Press 2009) 20 
18 Rinus van Schendelen, Machiavelli In Brussels The Art Of Lobbying The EU (Amsterdam University Press 2002) 68–
69 
19 Bouwen (n 17) 22 
20 Klüver (n 9) 41 
21 Coen (n 7) 335. See also Schendelen (n 18) 69, who argues that this stage of the legislative process is the most crucial 
for lobbying organizations. 
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before any formalized documents are in place as a form of ‘early lobbying’.22 If the lobbying 
organization is able to ensure that any draft legislation represents their preferred policy outcome, then 
the ‘lobbying objective during the ensuing legislative process would then become the defence of the 
Commission’s proposal, which is often easier than introducing changes to it’.23 
The European Parliament is also subject to the same need for externally provided information. 
Upon receipt of draft legislation from the Commission in the field of internal market (including 
intellectual property), the Parliament must then assess it and determine whether to pass it through co-
decision with the Council (now known as the ordinary legislative procedure).24 As with the 
Commission, the Parliament is comprised of members from all over the EU, who will have radically 
different competences, skills and backgrounds. Information asymmetry continues to play a role in the 
Parliament, as MEPs need access to information that helps them to understand and assess a 
legislative proposal.25 According to an interviewed policy adviser at the European Parliament, 
 
We cannot do our work without the information from interest groups. They send us 
amendments and voting lists prior to the committee and plenary vote. Sometimes it is very 
tempting to copy and paste their amendments and voting lists. I mean we are all so busy in 
Parliament.26  
 
While the council is also subject to lobbying pressures, this occurs generally at the level of the 
national experts seconded to the institution, or at the level of national governments.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
22 Bouwen (n 17) 20 
23 Mack (n 4) 345 
24 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47 Article 294 
25 Klüver (n 9) 41 
26 Maja Kluger Rasmussen, ‘The Lobbying See-Saw: Who Tips The Scales In The European Parliament?’ (12th Biennial 
International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Boston, 2011) 8 
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due to the somewhat closed and opaque nature of the Council as an institution,27 it is difficult to 
conduct research on this body and assess their role in these legislative developments. For this reason, 
the assessment of the influence of lobbying organizations on the copyright lawmaking process will 
focus on the European Commission and European Parliament. 
 
3. Knowledge, Issue Framing and Political Salience: Determinants of European Union 
Institutional Policy 
 
The preceding section helps us to understand why European institutions listen to the claims of 
lobbying organizations. Indeed, reliance upon the information provided by these organizations 
appears to be understood as an essential dimension to the legislative process. Yet it does not answer 
the question as to why some lobbyists are more successful than others in having their preferred 
outcomes adopted by European institutions, either generally, or specifically in the case of copyright 
law. In reality, the problem of the European institutions, and in particular the Commission, is not in 
gaining access to information, but trying to sort through the information provided and ‘make sense of 
the avalanche…that comes at them from every direction’.28 What approach is taken to a particular 
policy issue, and the success of a particular lobbying organization or business sector in influencing 
that policy choice, is largely determined by three inter-related factors – knowledge/expertise, issue 
framing and political salience. As has already been discussed in the previous section, institutions 
such as the Commission are reliant upon information provided by external sources, both in order to 
draft legislation and to determine policy agendas. Industry representatives in particular are able to 
take advantage of this information asymmetry in order to influence the direction of a particular 
                                                 
27 Timothy Bainbridge, The Penguin Companion To European Union (Penguin 2002) 107; Rainer Eising, ‘The Access Of 
Business Interests To EU Institutions: Towards Élite Pluralism?’ (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 384 
28 Baumgartner (n 10) 124 
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policy. Nevertheless, information, and indeed evidence provided by experts, is non-neutral.29 Each 
actor seeking to influence policy is doing so because they desire, or wish to prevent, a particular 
result. In environmental policy, for example, a large oil producer may wish to prevent or ‘water-
down’ strict regulations relating to liability in the event of oil spills. In taxation policy, large 
multinationals may wish to avoid legislation that places restrictions on the movement of capital. Yet 
industry actors will be cautious in their justifications for a preferred policy outcome. It is highly 
unlikely that a representative of an oil producer will say ‘we do not want liability because it may hurt 
our profit margins’; a representative for a large multinational will hardly say to the Commission ‘we 
want legislation that will provide us with tax-cuts. Why? We are operating out of pure self-interest’.30 
Instead, these desired outcomes (such as lower taxation) will be linked to a policy objective that may 
be held by an institution such as the Commission (such as economic growth). This can be referred to 
as ‘issue framing’. By presenting information in a particular way, lobbying organizations are able to 
influence how a particular policy is achieved, or indeed, whether something is considered as being a 
policy at all. The techniques that can be used in order to successfully frame an issue include direct 
lobbying and information provision, participation in expert committees or working groups, and the 
framing of issues favourably in the media.31 An expert committee or working group is a key stage in 
the legislative process to influence legislative development. If representatives from a particular sector 
                                                 
29 For a much larger analysis of this issue that takes the work of Michele Foucault as a basis, see Benjamin Farrand, 
Networks Of Power In Digital Copyright Law And Policy: Political Salience, Expertise And The Legislative Process 
(Routledge 2014) ch 1 
30 From a theoretical perspective, one way in which the political actor acting in their own self-interest can be explained is 
through public choice theory, a political science perspective heavily influenced by rational choice theory scholars in the 
field of economics.  Rational choice theory as applied to political processes (concerning the allocation of ‘public goods’, 
hence public choice theory) is the theory that leaders of political parties are not driven by a sense of what policies are in 
the public interest, but are motivated by rational self-interest, and will therefore ‘formulate policies in order to win 
elections rather than win elections in order to formulate policies’, as described in Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory 
Of Democracy (Harper and Row 1957) 27. This theory, which became influential in political science studies of political 
behaviour, has been expanded to the study of lobbying organisations acting as ‘agenda-setters’, by writers such as George 
Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton University Press 2002). Industry representatives, this 
theory goes, are rational actors who will act in such a way as to maximise their utility through the adoption of approaches 
to legislators best able to maximise their chances of success.  However, as this article focuses on how an actor attains their 
objectives, rather than focusing on explaining why they possess those objectives, public choice theory is not used as the 
theoretical framework for analysis. 
31 Culpepper (n 14) 8–9 
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gain access to one of these bodies, they are then granted significant agenda-setting ability, with the 
‘power to set the terms of the debate in an environment that is established with an explicit eye to 
protecting their interests’32. Lütz et al provide an example of this form of policy involvement, 
referring to the Cadbury Committee set up in the UK in the 1990s.33 The Committee was set up as the 
result of a loss of confidence in market regulators after allegations of market manipulation, fraud and 
bad practice, with the goal of improving corporate governance.34 The Committee was ‘dominated by 
the market players (among them the accounting profession, institutional investors, lawyers, 
corporations, the Bank of England and the London Stock Exchange), while public interests were not 
represented’.35 This meant that the recommendations that resulted distinctly favoured the balance 
between ‘investor protection and managerial flexibility’ that suited the members of the Committee.36 
The European Commission also uses expert committees during the policy development stage. 
Referred to as ‘consultative committees’, these bodies can be set up by the relevant DG of the 
Commission in order to attain expert knowledge. These bodies can either take the form of large 
stakeholder hearings, medium-sized roundtables, or small expert groups, and they can either be 
standing committees, which are permanent consultation bodies, or ad hoc committees, temporary 
bodies set up to consider a particular problem or as a response to a particular development. 
According to Bouwen, these ad-hoc committees ‘focus the attention of their members on a precise 
problem for a limited period of time and are therefore often more influential’.37 Participation in these 
consultative committees, particularly the small expert groups, is considered a high priority for 
industry representatives in the EU, as they are considered a ‘crucial action point for private interests 
                                                 
32 ibid 9 
33 Susanne Lütz and others, ‘Varieties Of Private Self-Regulation In European Capitalism: Corporate Governance Codes 
In The UK And Germany’ (2011) 9 Socioecon Rev 315 
34 ibid 319 
35 ibid 
36 ibid 320 
37 Bouwen (n 17) 30 
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to influence the EU decision-making process’.38 According to Mahoney, in 2004 business was the 
dominant actor in these consultative committees, having approximately 72% of the committee 
positions39, a position that is unlikely to have changed dramatically. 
The other way in which lobbying organizations can influence the legislative process is by 
framing the issue favourably in the media. Media framing, as defined by Iyengar, refers to ‘subtle 
alterations in the statement or presentation of judgment and choice problems’.40 In other words, 
media framing is the way in which a particular issue is discussed in and by the media, including 
which aspects of the story are highlighted, and what is considered a problem. For example, a story 
about a large construction project being finished could be reported in different ways. It may be 
reported as a story in which the completion of the project has resulted in the establishment of new 
office premises allowing a large company to increase its number of staff and provided services, 
benefitting local workers and the economy. Alternatively, the story could be presented as one of 
corruption, involving a murky tendering process, substantial delays in the completion of the project, 
and questions regarding the use of funds. Iyengar argues that media coverage can be used to 
‘manipulate’ public preferences, whether concerning taxation policy, the funding of public bodies, or 
general social issues.41 A financial services company could use the media to promote a view that the 
effective functioning of the economy is directly linked to the continued success and health of their 
particular business.42 This is not to say that the media is a passive conduit for the views of politicians, 
business people or other interested actors. Instead, Baum and Potter argue that the public tends to be 
ill-informed about policy issues, and the impact of certain approaches to policy, with the result that 
‘information equilibrium tends to favour leaders, and hence, the media are more responsive to 
                                                 
38 ibid 
39 Christine Mahoney, ‘The Power Of Institutions State And Interest Group Activity In The European Union’ (2004) 5 
European Union Politics 441, 450 
40 Shanto Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues (University of Chicago Press 1991) 
11 
41 ibid 12–13 
42 Culpepper (n 14) 10 
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leaders’ preferences than those of the public’.43 This means that public attitudes towards a particular 
issue can be moulded by those leaders, whether government ministers or business leaders, meaning 
that ‘without a clear understanding of the issue to anchor their responses, most were willing to be 
persuaded by the arguments they were offered’.44 Information asymmetry equally applies to citizens 
as to European institutions; in fact, the lack of information is likely to be far more pronounced when 
dealing with non-expert members of the public. It may be that the public’s only awareness of a 
particular issue is based upon media reporting of that issue. Therefore, in order to generate public 
support for a particular policy, industry representatives may attempt to use the media as a way of 
convincing the public of the importance of their preferred outcome. 
Yet this does not mean that the combination of knowledge and the ability to frame policy 
decisions will result in lobbying organizations always being able to achieve their objectives. Despite 
sitting on expert committees or providing expert information to legislators, the oil producer, for 
example, may still be subject to regulatory oversight. A final factor that will determine the success of 
a lobbying organization in influencing the legislative process is the political salience of an issue. 
Political salience, according to Culpepper, is a way of assessing the importance of an issue to the 
average voter, ‘relative to other political issues’.45 If an issue has high political salience, voters are 
much more likely to vote on the basis of that issue, meaning the response by elected officials to that 
issue can be a ‘vote winner’ (if citizens support the approach to that issue), or perhaps of more 
concern to individuals facing re-election, a ‘vote loser’ (if citizens are unhappy with the response of 
that individual to that issue). It is important to note, however, that political salience is an assessment 
of the importance of a particular issue, rather than an assessment of the public’s support for a 
                                                 
43 Matthew A Baum and Philip BK Potter, ‘The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, And Foreign 
Policy: Toward A Theoretical Synthesis’ (2008) 11 Annual Review of Political Science 39, 50 
44 Deborah Lynn Guber and Christopher Bosso, ‘Framing ANWR: Citizens, Consumers, And The Privileged Position Of 
Business’ in Michael E Kraft and Sheldon Kamieniecki (eds), Business and environmental policy corporate interests in 
the American political system (MIT Press 2007) 43 
45 Culpepper (n 14) 11 
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particular approach to that issue.46 A relatively topical issue at the moment is that of same-sex 
marriage. While in the UK, Westminster has passed the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, and 
the Scottish Parliament has passed the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, the issue 
of same sex marriage is very divisive in some countries, and in particular, some states in the US. In 
Utah, for example, the Appeals Court is currently hearing a case involving a voter-approved ban on 
same-sex marriage, which activists are trying to get overturned.47 For voters in Utah, same-sex 
marriage will be a highly salient issue, which may determine their voting preferences. For those who 
disapprove of same-sex marriage, they may vote according to the statements of elected officials on 
same-sex marriage, either supporting a candidate who publicly condemns same-sex marriage, or to 
remove a supporter of same-sex marriage from office. In comparison, some issues will be considered 
to be of low political salience. For example, in December 2013, the British Parliament passed the 
City of London (Various Powers) Act 2013, which provides the City of London with powers to grant 
temporary licenses to street traders to sell wares in designated areas. A technical piece of legislation 
making modifications to street trading rules is unlikely to generate much public interest, and as a 
result, voters are unlikely to vote to ‘reward’ or ‘punish’ elected officials for their vote on such an 
issue. ‘”Read my lips; No new poison pills” is an unlikely campaign slogan in any country’.48 Issue 
salience is changeable however, rather than being static, as issues come to be seen as more or less 
important over time.49 As we shall see, salience ‘rises and falls with news coverage, presidential 
speeches, world events…and the activities of interest groups’.50 
Culpepper argues that in environments of low political salience, lobbying groups such as 
those representing corporate managers have ‘access to superior weapons for battles that take place 
                                                 
46 Ken Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion And Interest Group Strategies (Princeton University Press 1998) 25 
47 Associated Press, ‘Appeals Court Appears Divided Over Utah Same-Sex Marriage Case’, The Guardian (10 April 
2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/10/utah-gay-marriage-federal-judges-divided> accessed 12 April 
2014 
48 Culpepper (n 14) 5 
49 Benjamin I Page and Robert Y Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years Of Trends In Americans’ Policy Preferences 
(The University of Chicago Press 1992) 
50 Kollman (n 46) 25 
 14 
away from the public spotlight…[and]…are decided by what I call “quiet politics”’.51 In this 
environment, lobbying organizations can rely upon information provision, agenda-setting capacity 
and the ability to frame issues in the media in order to influence legislation in their favour. ‘When an 
issue is of little interest to voters, the press has little incentive to cover it and ambitious politicians 
gain little by acquiring expertise in it’.52 In these situations Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs), for example, may not invest particular time or effort in understanding the complexities of a 
particular piece of proposed legislation, nor to informing themselves of the context and background 
to that proposal, instead relying upon the information provision and provided expertise of lobbying 
organizations. As the European Parliament is both visible and accountable to the European Union 
electorate through the European elections, MEPs are more responsive to pressures from the general 
public (although it must be stated that in general, EU citizen attention paid to the European 
Parliament is rather low) than an institution such as the European Commission.53 Websites such as 
‘votewatch.eu’ for example provide information on the voting patterns of particular MEPs, political 
groupings, and votes on particular pieces of legislation.54 For this reason, where political salience is 
high, MEPs can be pressured to vote based on citizen views, as will become important in the 
discussions of the ACTA vote in the European Parliament. However, where political salience is low, 
MEPs are likely to follow the recommendations of industry representatives.  
 
4. Lobbying the European Institutions: Agenda-Setting and Political Salience in Copyright Law 
 
As stated in the preceding section, success in influencing the direction of policy is dependent on three 
interrelated factors: - the provision of information, the ability to frame issues through early-agenda 
                                                 
51 Culpepper (n 14) 4 
52 ibid 20 
53 Klüver (n 9) 48 
54 ‘VoteWatch Europe: European Parliament, Council Of The EU’ (no date) <http://www.votewatch.eu/> accessed 12 
April 2014 
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setting and/or favourable media attention, and political salience. By examining three case studies of 
academically contentious, yet nevertheless successful legislative initiatives, it will be demonstrated 
that the success of industry lobbyists in securing preferable legislation has been based on long-
standing connections with policy-makers, participation in early working group meetings and 
successful agenda-setting, made possible through the environment of quiet politics that is facilitated 
by low political salience.  
 
A. The Information Society Directive: Setting the Agenda for EU Copyright Development 
 
The Information Society Directive55 has been referred to as being the subject of ‘unprecedented 
lobbying’,56 with the number of interests ‘engaged in active lobbying on [the proposal having been] 
striking’.57 Adopted in May 2001, the ostensible objectives of the Directive were to ensure 
compliance with international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and that the Internal Market 
was prepared for the technological challenges posed by the Internet through the harmonization of 
laws concerning the exploitation of copyright and related rights.58 The Information Society Directive 
harmonized the exclusive rights of reproduction59 communication60 and distribution61, while 
providing for an exhaustive list of optional exceptions and limitations.62 The Directive has been 
subject to substantial criticism by academics due to its overly restrictive nature, with rights defined 
                                                 
55 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L167/10 (Information Society Directive) 
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broadly and exceptions narrowly,63 as well as for the legal uncertainty caused by having a list of 
optional rather than mandatory exceptions and limitations to copyright.64 
 The origins of the Information Society Directive can be traced back to the establishment of a 
working group by the Commission, which released a report known as the Bangemann Report in 
1994. This working group, tasked with considering the changes needed in order to ensure that Europe 
would benefit from the advancement of telecommunications technologies and information processing 
techniques, produced recommendations on which the Council announced it would ‘adopt an 
operational programme defining precise procedures for action and the necessary means’.65 Already 
this demonstrates that the Bangemann working group was able to significantly influence the 
European Union institutions, and set the legislative agenda in the field of technology development. In 
a section of the Report on intellectual property rights (IPRs), it was stated that ‘there is information 
that is proprietary and needs protection via IPRs. IPRs are an important factor in developing a 
competitive European industry…across a wide range of industrial and commercial sectors’.66 For this 
reason, the Bangemann Report tasked the European institutions with giving IPRs their full attention, 
as Europe ‘has a vested interest in ensuring that a high level of protection is maintained’.67 Page 6 of 
the Report provides a list of the members of the working group, which including the chair, Martin 
Bangemann, comprised twenty representatives from the creative and innovation-based industries, 
including Volvo, Elsevier, Bang & Olufsen, IBM and Général Canal +, described in the Report as 
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‘prominent persons’.68 The Council acknowledged in a supplement to the Report that the European 
institutions, as well as the Member States, had ‘an important role to play in…giving political impetus 
[and] creating a clear and stable regulatory framework’ in the field of intellectual property rights.69 
The following year, the Commission released a Green Paper in which the need to harmonize 
copyright was discussed.70 In this Green Paper, the Commission stated that ‘the protection of 
copyright and related rights is vital to the Internal Market, and has cultural, economic and social 
implications for the Community’.71As well as reiterating the Bangemann Report’s statement that 
Europe has a vested interest in maintaining a high level of protection for IPRs72, it states that ‘priority 
should be given to harmonizing the rules on the protection of both copyright and related rights to 
provide a high level of protection’.73 In a Communication published by the Commission in 1996,74 it 
was then stated that ‘Europe’s traditionally high level of protection must be maintained and further 
developed’.75 In the resulting Proposal for a Directive76 the Commission reiterated that ‘the proposal 
aims at maintaining the traditionally advanced level of copyright protection in Europe’.77 It would 
appear, therefore, that an agenda of ensuring high levels of protection for copyright had been set prior 
to the drafting of a Directive. 
 The process of the Information Society Directive also shows the impact that information and 
perceived expertise can have on legislative development. If we turn to an earlier Green Paper, 
published by the Commission in 1988, we see that ‘piracy’ of copyrighted works is considered a 
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priority as it had ‘emerged as a serious problem for copyright industries and for creative artists’.78 
While this Green Paper was not necessarily written with the Information Society Directive in mind, 
expert knowledge provided helped to establish the ‘problem’ that the Commission felt it necessary to 
combat. The evidence demonstrating that copyright infringement was becoming a serious problem all 
appeared to be generated by one source, recording industry advocacy organization IFPI (the 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), which provided statistics and figures 
regarding the economic loss resulting from copyright infringement.79 In the 1995 Green Paper, the 
Commission referred to the ‘danger of piracy…and the need for arrangements…for the progressive 
introduction of techniques to limit copying of this kind’.80 It was not only knowledge of the creative 
industries that lobbying organizations possessed, however, but knowledge of European institutional 
processes. As well as influencing the policy agenda regarding copyright at the pre-Proposal stage, 
industry representatives quickly moved to the European Parliament, outmatching those lobbying the 
Parliament on behalf of users’ rights. According to one interview conducted by Burrell and Coleman 
with the head of an organization representing the interests of libraries and archives, ‘user groups face 
an uphill struggle…mentioning a lack of resources and expertise in lobbying and the general 
mismatch between user groups and organisations such as IFPI, Walt Disney and Vivendi’.81 Rather 
than being able persuade the Parliament to relax some of the provisions on copyright protection, 
these user groups instead found that industry representative organizations were effective in 
persuading the Parliament to increase the restrictiveness of the proposed Directive.82 A second 
interviewee stated that whereas they had assumed that MEPs from the Socialist grouping would 
support their position, as they ‘ought to be natural allies of user groups’,83 they found that MEPs were 
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hostile to their views, and regarded ‘copyright as an esoteric subject with which they need not 
concern themselves’.84 Furthermore, it was difficult for opponents to the Directive to generate 
support amongst other consumer organizations, as they believed it ‘too difficult to translate concerns 
about copyright into the issues that consumers actually care about’.85 This statement is somewhat 
telling, as it suggests that copyright law is an area of high complexity and low political salience. 
MEPs did not consider it worth informing themselves about the copyright debate, and consumer 
organizations did not appear particularly concerned. In the UK in particular, there was very little 
media reporting concerning the proposed Directive, and what reporting there was presented the issue 
as being one of ensuring protection of copyright from infringement, with statements from industry 
bodies such as IFPI.86 The paucity of coverage, and in particular coverage negatively predisposed to 
the Directive allowed industry representatives to publicly frame the issue favourably in a way that 
may not have been possible in an environment of high political salience. 
 
B. The Enforcement Directive: Quiet Politics and Quiet Battles Over Technical Legislation 
 
The Enforcement Directive87 was passed in June 2004, entering into force a mere one year and six 
months from its initial announcement in January 2003.88 Kierkegaard argues that the speed of 
implementation, with the European Parliament passing the Directive after the first reading rather than 
being subjected to a second, was to ‘prevent the New Members [of the EU] from influencing the 
content of the controversial provisions’.89 The Directive, a technical piece of legislation, intended to 
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harmonize Member States’ approach to issues such as interested parties having the right to bring 
infringement claims90, evidential requirements91 and the right to information that can be requested 
from an infringer concerning the origin and distribution network for IPR infringing goods or 
services.92 This right to information was regarded as being particularly controversial, because 
Internet Service Providers could be required to provide information on their subscribers, raising 
concerns for privacy as well as the proportionality of the Directive.93 
  While IPR infringement had been identified as an issue by European institutions as far back 
as 1988, and the Bangemann Report further influencing the agenda for copyright lawmaking in the 
EU, another working group appears to have had influence over EU policy development concerning 
the need for further enforcement provisions. Meeting in Munich in 1999, a consultative committee 
was set up to discuss links between organized crime and IPR infringement. This group, according to 
the Commission, comprised ‘trade associations, intellectual property right-holders, companies, 
lawyers, academics, national administrations [and] other European institutions’.94 The meeting 
appears to have influenced the Commission’s policy approach concerning the Enforcement Directive. 
In the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive,95 it was stated that ‘consultation of interested 
circles…confirmed, with the support of examples in the field of music and software, the links 
between counterfeiting and piracy and organised crime’.96 While in a 1998 Green Paper the 
Commission indicated that IPR infringement might be a way of laundering the proceeds of organized 
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crime97, this view appeared to be reinforced by the 1999 consultative committee meeting. 
Furthermore, the Commission stated in the Proposal, the parties present at the consultation ‘expressed 
the desire for this question to be tackled energetically and for far-reaching measures to be taken at the 
level of the European Union’.98 Once again, the involvement of industry representatives from early in 
the pre-legislative process appears to have helped to set the agenda for copyright lawmaking, 
establishing what problem had to be addressed (in this case, the fight against organized crime, and 
the role of IPR infringement in those activities), and what measures were required in order to resolve 
that problem. 
 Upon release of the Proposal, there was significant concern in the telecoms industry 
concerning their potential obligation to disclose subscriber information in cases of alleged copyright 
infringement. As a result, three major providers, British Telecom, Nokia and Telecom Italia formed 
an umbrella organization, the European Telecommunications Network Operators Association (or 
ETNO) in order to lobby the European Parliament against the passing of the Directive.99 However, as 
becomes evident due to the fact that the Directive was successful, this effort was unsuccessful. ETNO 
was formed relatively late in the legislative process of the Directive. In comparison, creative industry 
representatives had been active since at least the 1999 consultative committee meeting in Munich, 
effectively framing the Commission approach to copyright enforcement. Furthermore, as Haunss and 
Kohlmorgen found through interviews with actors involved in the process, IFPI, the previously 
mentioned industry representative organization, had been actively involved in the drafting of the 
Directive, and had ‘exerted great influence from the start’.100 Of particular importance, it was 
concluded, were ‘the good contacts with the European Parliament [and] active cooperation with the 
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European Commission’.101 In comparison, ETNO was regarded as being ‘too small and developed 
too late to exert significant influence on the decision making process’.102 Knowledge, both of their 
sector and of the European institutions and their legislative processes, allowed industry representative 
organizations such as IFPI to exert influence over the direction of the Commission’s Proposal. By 
being actively involved in the early stages, they were able to set the agenda, meaning that their role in 
the Parliament would be to support and defend the Proposal; ETNO, in comparison, were not 
involved in setting the legislative agenda and instead had to attempt to modify it, which is much more 
difficult.103 Had this been occurring in an environment of high political salience, it is possible that the 
Directive may have been modified (although, ultimately, this is speculation). However, the passing of 
the Information Society Directive indicates that copyright law is a low salience issue, which does not 
particularly interest the average European voter. Haunss and Kohlmorgen found that the passage of 
the Enforcement Directive was only visible in the European press from September 2003 to March 
2004, with only forty-seven claims made about the Directive, most of them favourable104. In the UK, 
there appeared to be only six stories, of which three were favourable, two negative and one neutral 
(presenting both positive and negative claims).105 ETNO’s views, in comparison to the views of the 
Commission and industry representatives, did not get reported by the media.106 This would appear to 
indicate that in low salience conflicts between lobbying organizations, the principle of ‘quiet politics’ 
applies, and those able to set the legislative agenda and provide key information to policy-makers is 
more likely to be able to influence the legislative process. 
 
C. The Term Extension Directive: Choosing Between Experts 
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In 2011, the EU enacted legislation increasing the term of protection for sound recordings from 50 to 
70 years. The Term Extension Directive107 was roundly condemned by academics working in the 
field of copyright law, both before and after its delayed approval by the Council, due to the fact that it 
was unlikely to achieve its stated aim of improving remuneration for recording artists and session 
musicians while reducing the number of works to enter the public domain, increasing innovation 
costs and costs to consumers.108 Indeed, in an editorial in the European Intellectual Property Review 
signed by more than fifty academics working in intellectual property law and policy, it was stated 
that the proposed Directive was the culmination of ‘years of fierce lobbying by the trade bodies of the 
record industry’.109 In a strongly worded open letter to the President of the Commission and the 
Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services DG, one academic stated that a study 
commissioned by the Commission to consider the impact of an extension of the term of protection 
was ignored in the Commission Impact Assessment ‘except for a single mention in footnote 51, 
which quotes our study out of context’.110 In so doing, the Commission ‘reinforces the 
suspicion…that its policies are less the product of a rational decision-making process than of 
lobbying by stakeholders’.111 In order to provide context to this statement, it is necessary to look at 
the process by which the Directive was adopted in more detail. 
 The proposal to extend the term of protection for sound recordings did not originate at the EU 
level, but was in fact an initiative begun in the UK. In 2005, Gordon Brown (then Chancellor of the 
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Exchequer) commissioned Andrew Gowers to conduct a review into the effectiveness (or not) of 
intellectual property laws in the UK. The Gowers Review was completed in 2006, and predominantly 
on the basis of academic literature112 concluded that an extension of copyright to 95 years, as 
advocated for by the recording industry, was not justified and in fact potentially result in a loss of 
revenue for artists.113 On this news, the British Phonographic Industry (BPI) released a statement 
indicating that ‘if the UK government decides not to support copyright equalization then the music 
industry will have to continue its campaign in Europe. The signs there are encouraging’.114 In fact, 
prior to the release of the Gowers Review, the Commission ran a consultative exercise that began in 
July and concluded in October 2006, which received over 175 responses.115 The short period that the 
consultation ran, similar to that of the Information Society Directive, means that it becomes ‘almost 
inevitable that [only those who] were already geared-up to respond would provide input’.116 
Knowledge of legislative processes, and having information readily accessible to provide to such 
consultations both assist in setting the legislative agenda and creating the appearance of particular 
expertise, which in turn helps to influence the direct of a particular policy.117 User advocacy groups, 
in comparison, are less able to quickly respond to such calls, and are less likely to be able to 
influence the process. In this instance, IFPI was one of the contributors to the consultation, and stated 
that the: 
 
The term of protection for sound recordings should be extended within Europe from 50 to 95 
years to match the term in the U.S. In an online global market, performers and producers in 
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the EU are at a substantial disadvantage compared with the US and many other trading 
partners. They argue that consistent longer terms of protection will facilitate the dissemination 
of works into a larger number of markets and provide an incentive for the development of 
new ways of getting back catalogue, specialised genres and niche music to consumers.118 
 
There is a reason for printing the quote in full. In 2008, the Commission released a Communication 
on Creative Content Online, which did not mention term extension, but was accompanied by a 
Working Paper, which did. In fact, the Commission reproduced the quote from IFPI in its entirety.119 
This appears to suggest that IFPI were actively involved in setting the agenda for copyright term 
extension in the EU from at least 2006. In an Impact Assessment made by the Commission in 2008 
that accompanied the Term Extension Directive Proposal,120 the Commission relied heavily upon a 
study commissioned by the BPI and written by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). As was already 
mentioned, a Commission-commissioned study by the Institute for Information Law (IViR) at the 
University of Amsterdam was referred to in a footnote. The justification for its reliance on the PWC 
Report is given when the Commission states it was the ‘only study based on actual data and enables 
us to add a concrete dimension to the results’.121 In comparison, more sceptical studies such as the 
IViR study did not appear to fit with the legislative agenda, as it recommended no change to the term 
of protection. In this instance, two expert opinions were in conflict with each-other. Whereas 
Hugenholtz argued that the acceptance of one over the other was a sign of intense lobbying pressure 
rather than rational decision-making,122 it is important to return to the statement made in the 
beginning of section 3 of this article, namely that the Commission has the task of sorting through 
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information provided in order to formulate a policy in a particular area. It is submitted that the choice 
of policy is not one of a dichotomy between ‘lobbying’ and ‘rational decision-making’, but 
determining which information provided is most convincing to that institution. The combination of 
agenda-setting, knowledge provision and issue salience is likely to be the deciding factor in the 
selection of which approach to take. Furthermore, as was indicated in preceding sections, key actors 
such as IFPI already had long-lasting and strong connections with both the Commission and 
Parliament, reinforcing perceptions of expertise possessed by an industry actor that frequently 
provided information to those institutions. By the time that the IViR study was completed, the 
legislative agenda had been set, and the Commission had to determine the most suitable way of 
ensuring the further reimbursement of performers and session musicians, and for what time period. A 
recommendation to not extend the term would be in direct conflict with that agenda, and would have 
difficulty in changing it. That this was a low salience issue, with only thirteen identifiable stories in 
the British press, the majority of which presenting the term extension favourably and quoting IFPI 
and pro-extension studies,123 meant that the issue could be framed effectively by the creative 
industries. 
 
5. The High Political Salience of Copyright? The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Public 
Protest and Citizen Lobbying 
 
As the last section has demonstrated, copyright lawmaking in the EU is characterised by low political 
salience and influential industry representative organizations able to both set the legislative agenda 
and provide information pertinent to that agenda. To use Culpepper’s term, it is an area of policy 
defined by quiet politics, in which policymakers defer to industry expertise, even where other 
expertise is provided. This does not suggest, however, that ‘big business always gets what big 
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business wants’. As has been discussed, political salience is changeable, based on changing 
circumstances, or even changing media coverage of an issue. To provide an example both of this 
changing salience, and of the ability to set the legislative agenda did not result in successfully passed 
legislation, it is possible to use the example of the recent vote of the European Parliament on ACTA.  
 ACTA began as a series of informal talks between the US and Japan in 2006 on the topic of 
counterfeiting and piracy in the context of international trade, with the discussion of a potential 
bilateral or even plurilateral treaty.124 By June 2008, these informal talks became a formalized 
negotiation between the US, Japan, the EU, Canada, Australia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Switzerland.125 However, these negotiations were secretive, with 
each party held to a strict confidentiality requirement, to the extent that legislative bodies in each 
State were uninformed about the detail of the negotiations.126 However, certain industry 
representative organizations had privileged access to the negotiation documents in the capacity of 
‘cleared advisors’.127 These cleared advisors included representatives of the Intellectual Property 
Alliance (IIPA), IBM and Time Warner.128 According to Blakeney, these cleared advisors, such as 
IIPA were active participants in the ACTA negotiations,129 suggesting considerable agenda-setting 
power on the part of these industry representatives. The public only became aware of the existence of 
the negotiations with an initial leak of a statement of initial positions released by WikiLeaks in May 
2008.130 Substantive content came in the form of leaks by online activist organizations such as La 
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Quadrature du Net (LQDN) of draft deliberations in 2009 and 2010, and the release of an interim 
draft by the EU in April 2010. Information contained in these deliberative drafts revealed that the 
intention of the Agreement was not only to bring in enforcement provisions to deal with counterfeit 
goods in transit between states, but also to apply to infringements of copyright committed online. 
According to Article 2.14 of this Draft131, parties could impose of criminal sanctions ‘at least in cases 
of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale’, 
which was intended to include wilful copyright and related rights infringements ‘that have no direct 
or indirect motivation of financial gain’. This appeared to extend substantially the scope of criminal 
liability for copyright infringement, making it a de facto criminal offence.132 ACTA began to be 
frequently criticized in academic literature, particularly over the secrecy of negotiations133 and the 
deliberate attempt to sidestep both the World Intellectual Property Organization and World Trade 
Organization in order to prevent substantive input from countries such as China and India.134 The text 
of the Agreement was substantially modified subsequent to the publication of the earlier drafts, with 
Article 23(1) stating that criminal sanctions should be applied in cases of copyright or related-rights 
’piracy’ on a commercial scale, intended to include ‘at least those carried out as commercial activities 
for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage’. It was determined that these sanctions 
should apply in cases of infringement of copyright online under Article 27(1).135 Nevertheless, this 
Draft continued to be criticized, with concerns over the scope of possible criminal sanctions and 
enforcement136 as well as the possible impact on user privacy.137 
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 The EU and 22 of its Member States signed ACTA in Japan at a formal ceremony in January 
2012. It was assumed at this point that the EU ratification of the Agreement was certain.138 ACTA 
had the full support of the business community,139 and the Commission, which regarded the rapid 
conclusion and implementation of the Agreement as being ‘an important step in improving the 
international fight against IPR infringements’.140 Furthermore, European Parliament had released a 
Resolution in 2010 stating that that reiterated the need to ensure effective protection of intellectual 
property rights and considered ACTA a step in the ‘right direction’.141 This would appear to indicate 
that the legislative agenda had been set, and that activist organizations would be unlikely to prevent 
the ratification of the Agreement. However, by April 2012 ACTA was described as being ‘on its 
knees’.142 What had changed? A key development in the EU rejection of ACTA appeared to have 
originated in the US. In October 2011, Representative Lamar Smith introduced a Bill in the House of 
Representatives called the Stop Online Piracy Act (or SOPA).143 This Bill contained a provision that 
would require ISPs to block access to websites used to infringe copyright or trademark through the 
use of a measure that would prevent a domain name being resolved to an IP address.144 Critics 
viewed this as draconian and with the potential to be used for censorship, and major Internet service 
providers in particular were concerned about their potential liability under the Bill. So concerned 
were certain providers that 18 January 2012 was a day of concerted and coordinated action by 
thousands of websites including Wikipedia and Reddit became inaccessible, presenting a black 
background, text describing the potential effect of the Bill, and providing information for contacting 
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Representatives, whereas Google ‘censored’ their own logo.145 Due to the high profile of this action, 
on 20 January, Representative Smith announced that the Bill would be postponed ‘until there is wider 
agreement on the solution’.146 The relation to ACTA reflects the nature of the Internet as a global 
communications system – websites did not become inaccessible in the US alone, but were also 
inaccessible in the EU. Given the high profile of the US-based action, European citizens became 
aware of ACTA. When Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Poland announced his intention to ratify 
ACTA, declaring it a ‘success of the Polish EU Presidency’,147 an online campaign was initiated in 
Poland, including the creation of a Facebook page ‘Nie dla ACTA’, which received 100,000 views in 
less than 48 hours.148 Online activists coordinated offline action, culminating in ‘15,000 
demonstrators in Krakow and 5,000 in Wroclaw’,149 and an increase in media attention in the rest of 
Europe. It has been argued that this political mobilisation began in Poland due to a combination of 
socio-economic and historical factors, including that copyright was used as a tool of political 
censorship by the government of Poland during the latter years of Communist rule.150 This concern 
translated into concerns over copyright overreach, negative implications for freedom of speech and 
concerns over process,151 as evidenced by a statement made by one of the organisers of the ACTA 
protests that ‘They promised debates – nothing. They promised openness – nothing. Democracy is 
being destroyed, the deputies don’t know what they are signing, and all this will lead to a situation 
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when bloggers, scientists and entrepreneurs will be qualified as criminals’.152 As a result of domestic 
pressure, Tusk announced in early February that ACTA would not be ratified by Poland, as it did not 
reflect ‘the realities of the twenty-first century’.153 Germany, Latvia, and the Czech Republic 
announced they would delay, if not block, the ratification of ACTA154 and the Slovenian ambassador 
to Japan publicly apologized for signing, referring to it as an act of ‘civic carelessness…[there was] 
too little transparency’.155 Street protests continued throughout the EU, with a ‘day of action’ on 11 
February, with reports of more than 25,000 protestors in Germany, 4,000 in Bulgaria, and thousands 
more throughout France, the UK, Romania and other Member States, coordinated by activist 
organizations such as LQDN, FightForTheFuture.org and the Open Rights Group.156  
 The success of civil society in raising awareness about an issue of concern is largely 
determined by the ability to disseminate information. According to Bennett and Toft, digital 
communications technologies such as social media platforms can help to coordinate (and blur the 
distinctions between) online and offline action, particularly when facilitating cross-border actions.157 
The use of Facebook as a communications mechanism, and the spread of information through 
blogging activities and tweets, facilitated by organisers such as LQDN, can result in the swift 
mobilisation of political activists who can ‘spread the message’ and organise political activities158. 
Actors such as LQDN then become key nodes in a network of activists, providing both 
communications infrastructure and information to other activists. What these activists ‘lack in terms 
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of traditional organisational resources they often gain in networking capacities through the use of 
social technologies to facilitate the maintenance and activation of [ties between civil society 
activists]’.159 In this context, protest constitutes a form of ‘outsider’ strategy160, a method by which 
concerns over a legislative policy can be voiced, or questions raised as to the legitimacy of a policy 
through disruptive action. These strategies do not in themselves change legislation, but raise media 
(and therefore citizen) attention, increasing the salience of an issue. The more media attention that an 
issue receives, the more likely it is that a population will see that issue as important. In this case, 
protests in Poland helped to draw attention to the Agreement, as well as framing ACTA as a threat to 
freedom and democracy due to the secrecy of negotiation and over-broad Internet copyright 
enforcement provisions. The outsider strategy of protest allowed for protestors to frame the media 
message as one of a threat to citizen freedoms, and substantial media coverage discussing ACTA in 
the terms used by protestors further assisted in bringing the issue to the attention of the general 
public, and subsequently to the reporting of the protests in other EU Member States, helping to form 
the informational basis for civil society organisation. In the period from the initial announcement of 
the existence of ACTA up until December 2011, there were in total twenty-five stories about ACTA 
on BBC News, and in the Guardian and Telegraph newspapers.161 In comparison, between January 
2012 and the rejection of ACTA in July, there were thirty-nine stories162, almost double the number 
in six months than there were in the previous three years, and the majority of them negative. This 
raised the profile of ACTA as a political issue, and the high-visibility public actions in the Member 
States was used as a way of generating additional forms of political action. LQDN created the 
‘piphone’, which could make Voice Over IP (or VOIP) calls to MEPs, as well as providing a 
searchable database that users could use to identify their MEP in order to raise their concerns about 
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ACTA.163 This proved to be a successful strategy, as LQDN coordinated EU citizens’ contacting of 
MEPs both during the committee stages of the European Parliamentary process, and again prior to 
the final vote. According to a press release by the European Parliament, there was ‘unprecedented 
direct lobbying by thousands of EU citizens who called on it to reject ACTA, in street 
demonstrations, e-mails to MEPs and calls to their offices’.164 As a result of these pressures, the 
Committees on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Industry, Research and Energy, Legal 
Affairs, Development and International Trade all recommended that the European Parliament reject 
ACTA. This recommendation was followed on 4 July, when ACTA was rejected by 478 votes to 39. 
 The rejection of ACTA can be explained in terms of political salience. As was seen with the 
examples of the three Directives, copyright law is generally an issue of low salience that does not 
register with the average European voter. For this reason, industry representatives are able to 
influence the passage of legislation to a significant extent. In comparison, ACTA became a politically 
salient issue, generating protests in Europe that were then covered by the media, leading to more 
widespread protests and inducing citizens to contact the European Parliament, a body that has a 
historically weak connection to voters. In particular, media coverage referred to the concern of 
protestors that the Agreement represented a threat to democracy and freedom of speech.165 This 
discourse in turn was reflected by MEPs. In April, rapporteur and MEP David Martin stated that the 
‘intended benefits of this international agreement are far outweighed by the potential threats to civil 
liberties […] the European Parliament cannot guarantee adequate protection for citizens' rights in the 
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future under Acta’.166 The European Parliament, constituting a body of elected representatives, is 
susceptible to pressure by voters. Where interest in a particular issue is low, it is likely to vote 
according to the information provided by expert bodies or lobbying organizations. Where the salience 
is high, however, and citizens demonstrate their interest in, and preferences concerning, a particular 
policy then they are more likely to listen to the public on that issue. This would appear to indicate 
that where an issue becomes ‘high profile’, the usual tactics of quiet politics are ineffective. As the 
media coverage was unfavourable, and represented the views of protestors rather than industry, the 
ability to mould public perception of the issue was also lost. ACTA had become a high salience issue. 
Nonetheless, it is important to state that that although ACTA was high salience, does not mean that 
copyright more generally has become a high salience issue. Speaking after the rejection of ACTA, 
David Martin stated that ‘this was not an anti-intellectual property vote. This group believes Europe 
does have to protect its intellectual property but ACTA was too vague a document’.167 European 
President Schulz also indicated that the key issue in the rejection of ACTA was the question of 
transparency and democratic participation, rather than intellectual property law, stating:  
 
The decision to reject ACTA was not taken lightly. It followed an intensive, inclusive and 
transparent debate with civil society, business organisations, national parliaments and many 
other stakeholders…All over Europe, people were engaged in protests and debates. The 
mobilisation of public opinion was unprecedented. As the President of the European 
Parliament, I am committed to dialogue with citizens and to make Europe more democratic 
and understandable.168 
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This would appear to indicate that while ACTA was a high salience issue, the decision to reject the 
Agreement cannot be considered as representing a shift in intellectual property policy at the EU level. 
The success of the ACTA protests and resultant media coverage was in providing a simple and 
effective frame for considering the impact of the Agreement, namely that of freedom and democracy. 
However, in doing so, the subject of dispute became ACTA specifically, and the threat posed by this 
one document, rather than any perceived threats resulting from overly broad copyright protection. 
Activists therefore petitioned for the rejection of ACTA by the European Parliament, and the 
European Parliament responded by rejecting ACTA.  It did not act as a catalyst for the rethinking of 
copyright, its aims or the appropriateness of its enforcement mechanisms. It is submitted that 
copyright lawmaking will continue to be an issue dominated by quiet politics, and as a result, 
industry organizations will continue to be successful in having their preferred outcomes taken into 
account. Passing a Resolution on the negotiations between the US and EU on the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership, the European Parliament stated ‘intellectual property is one of the 
driving forces of innovation and creation and a pillar of the knowledge-based economy, and that the 
agreement should include strong protection of precisely and clearly defined areas of intellectual 
property rights’.169 It would appear, then, despite the very visible conflict over, and indeed, change in 
legislative policy over ACTA, the legislative approach to copyright law issues in the EU ultimately 
remains unchanged. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
While the development of copyright law in the EU has been the subject of substantial academic 
contention, it is only very recently that it appears to be the subject of substantial citizen contention. 
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Copyright law and policy has been typified by an environment of quiet politics – one in which 
comparatively low interest in the subject demonstrated by voters has resulted in the ability of trade 
and industry associations to dictate the legislative approach through early agenda-setting, the framing 
of issues and the provision of expert knowledge. Early intervention by these actors, combined with 
scant media coverage and a need on the part of institutions such as the European Commission for 
information has meant that contemporary copyright laws have taken a distinctly industry-favourable 
timbre. Yet these developments should not be dismissed as an unchangeable form of regulatory 
capture that cannot be challenged.  Instead, they should be considered as the result of reforms to 
highly complex and technical areas of regulation, the relevance of which is not immediately apparent 
to the general public. The salience of an issue is changeable, and the more salient an issue becomes, 
the more likelihood of citizen awareness and civil society participation. Where salience is high, 
legislators will be more likely to take into account the views and preferences of citizens, even where 
they may be in conflict with the preferences of industry actors. 
The rejection of ACTA by the European Parliament is a key example of how a change in the 
salience of an issue can result in what appears to be a foregone legislative conclusion can be 
successfully challenged. Through the combination of offline, ‘outsider’ strategies such as public 
protest with online coordination and information dissemination, salience can be changed as the 
framing of that issue is changed – ACTA was no longer a matter of ensuring effective protection of 
intellectual property, but was a matter of censorship, of trade secrecy and a lack of democratic 
accountability. These comparatively low-complexity issues resounded with civil society, resulting in 
unprecedented lobbying of the European Union. However, while ACTA was rejected, attempts to 
strengthen enforcement mechanisms in copyright continues. For this reason, for those who perceive 
copyright as being an issue of industry dominance, too broad in its protections and too narrow in its 
limits, it is the salience of copyright as a system or regulation, rather than specific legislative 
instruments, that must be changed. 
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